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KaVir:
Why would I disagree with that statement? It's true. Before you jump on me, it does not necessarily imply what you want it to about the Diku license.
The specific example you pull out makes reference to the officious bystander test. Please demonstrate why an officious bystander would interpret the license as restrictively as you do.
From the top paragraph of your own link:
(Canadian law)
When Terms Are Implied:
"... There has to be strong evidence to support the conclusion that the implication of a term is permissible in the circumstances. It would seem that there are three main instances when this may be done: (i) when it is reasonably necessary, having regard to the surrounding circumstances; and in particular the previous course of dealing between the parties, if any; (ii) when there is an operative trade or business usage or custom that may be said to govern the relationship of the parties; and (iii) when some statute of its own motion implies a term into the kind of contract that is in question." (Fridman, Law of Contract in Canada, 3rd ed., p. 475, as quoted by Chipman, J.A. in Spiropoulos v. Chagnon (1998), 161 N.S.R.(2d) 202, para. 7.)
So, where's your required "strong evidence" of one of those three things? Show me some previous dealings between the parties, or some customs in this type of dealing (from the time the deal was made), or statutory law or precedent.
That certainly sounds like something you should look into if you want to substantiate your claims about certain activities violating the license.
Stilton
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